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Falkland Islands Demining Programme - Exploitation

EXPLOITATION OF ITEMS RECOVERED DURING DEMINING OPERATIONS: 2012/13
This report and the associated exploitation work was funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
Background
1.
Exploitation1 work was carried out on SB-33, SB-81 and P4B mines during Phase 1 of clearance
operations; findings from this work are detailed in the 2010 Falkland Islands Demining Programme
Exploitation Report.
2.

Exploitation work was conducted on the following items:
a. C3B anti-tank mines (Figure 1) recovered from SA064;
b. An SB-33 anti-personnel mine (Figure 2) discovered outside the mine rows of SA064;
c. Components of booby traps recovered from SA064.

3.

Work was carried out by Colin King, technical director of Fenix Insight Ltd, from 19 – 22 March 2013.

4.

The findings from this work were intended to assess the conditon of the ordnance in order to:
a. Establish the general condition of the mines;
b. Indicate their ability to function, either as designed, or by other mechanisms;
c. Highlight significant changes in their characteristics that might effect detectability or sensitivity.

Figure 1
The Spanish C3B anti-tank mine

Figure 2
The Italian SB-33 anti-personnel mine

Aim
5.
The aim of this report is to outline the findings from exploitation work provided within the Falkland
Islands demining programme during the third phase of clearance.
Mine exploitation
C3B

1

The process of disassembling explosive ordnance in order to accurately characterise the munition.

1
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6.
Cracks were observed in the plastic casing of C3B mines recovered shortly after the 1982 conflict; it
was therefore expected that mines remaining more than 30 years later would show substantial
deterioration.
7.

The deterioration of the plastic casing could be significant for the following reasons:
a. Cracks might allow water into the fuze housing, causing:
i. Rusting of the striker spring (with consequent reduction in detectability);
ii. Degradation of the ignition composition, with consequent inability to function.
b. The integrity of the fuze housing could be compromised, leading to a significant drop in
operating pressure. This means that an affected mine might function under a load similar to
that of an anti-personnel mine.
c. The break-up of the mine body might allow the main charge to disintegrate, eventually
rendering the mine ineffective.

8.

Findings from the exploitation of the C3B mines are at Annex A.

SB-33
9.
A solitary SB-33 anti-personnel mine was discovered in SA064, but located approximately 70 m from
the nearest mine row.
10. The mine had sustained external damage to the casing and the detonator plug, but it’s internal
condition was unknown.
11. The mine was set aside in the hope that exploitation might offer some explanation for its location
and condition.
12.

Findings from the exploitation of the SB-33 mine are at Annex B.

Booby trap
13. Remnants of a booby trap were discovered towards the southern end of SA064. The components
included the wooden stake, main charge, safety fuse and detonator. The firing device normally associated
with such booby traps had not yet been located.
14. Detailed exploitation of the booby trap remnants was not deemed to be worthwhile, but comments
are at Annex C.
Creation of training aids
15. The 14 C3B mines recovered for exploitation were rendered inert, with all explosive components
being sent for demolition. The bases of the inert mine casings were then marked with blue paint (the
NATO colour code for inert munitions). The inert mines are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Inert mines
for use as
training aids
and detection
samples

16. Most of the inert mines contain the original metal content and can therefore be used for detection
trials. The two mines with metal content removed were clearly marked and were retained for display
purposes only.
17.

One of the mines was sectioned to provide a training aid (Figure 4).

Figure 4
One of the
C3B mines
was sectioned
to produce
this training
aid

Conclusions
18.

The exploitation process was conducted successfully and without incident.

19. In particular, the work offered a detailed insight into the condition of the C3B mines and confirmed
the most likely explanation for the location and position of the isolated SB-33. It also provided inert
samples of C3B mines for use as detection samples and training aids.
20.

Detailed conclusions relating to the items examined are included in the relevant annexes.

Recommendations
21. The provision of technical support services, including the exploitation of target mine types and the
creation of inert samples, is recommended as a component of all future clearance contracts.
22. Exploitation activity may offer important information for future programmes on issues such as the
overall condition, viability and detectability of target mines. This type of technical intelligence should be
taken into account during the planning phases in order to allocate appropriate resources over a suitable
3
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period; it is therefore recommended that exploitation work is considered prior to the detailed planning of
clearance operations.
23. It is further recommended that there is a provision for additional technical support during a
programme, if necessary. The isolated SB-33 mine illustrated one scenario where this was worthwhile;
other scenarios might include detection anomalies, munitions in a particularly dangerous condition and
technical aspects of accident investigation.

Colin King
Technical Director
Fenix Insight Ltd
April 2013
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ANNEX A
EXPLOITATION OF THE C3B ANTI-TANK MINE
Background
1.
The C3B (shown in Figure A1) is a large and powerful anti-tank mine with the following specifcations
quoted by the Spanish manufacturer, Explosivos Alavese (EXPAL) SA:
Weight
Explosive weight
Explosive type

5.7 kg
5 kg
TNT/RDX/Al (50/30/20)

Diameter
Height
Operating pressure

290 mm
60 mm
275 kg

Figure A1
The Spanish C3B anti-tank mine,
shown here armed, with fuze fitted
and safety cap to the left

2.
The C3B uses a fuzing mechanism very similar to that of the P4B anti-personnel mine, protected by
an additional plastic assembly to bring the operating pressure up to an acceptable level. Most of the
components of the C3B are based on polystyrene plastic and are solvent-bonded together; this makes
disassembly difficult and potentially dangerous. Components of the C3B are shown in Figure A2.
3.
Other than the aluminised explosive, the sole metallic content of the C3B is a steel spring weighing
approximately 0.15 g. During Phase 1, it proved difficult to locate this spring reliably using any
commercially-available detector.

Figure A2
Components of
the C3B

A-1
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Methodology
4.
Each of the 32 C3B mines located in SA064 was photographed in position and allocated a unique
serial number. The mines were extracted from the ground and defuzed in the minefield. A sample of 14
mines were then selected and disassembled for examination.
5.
All of the mines had been buried beneath peaty soil and vegetation, with depths typically around 100
mm. Mines from a variety of conditions were represented within the 14 chosen; some were extracted from
firm ground while others were partially or completely submerged (see Figures A3 and A4).

Figure A3
C3B in firm ground

Figure A4
Some mines were submerged

6.
The mine bodies were opened and the main charge removed; the inside of the casing was then
cleaned and examined for cracks.
7.
The external and internal condition and constituency of the main charge was assessed before being
set aside for demolition.
8.
The webbing carrying handle (which is cast into the explosive) was cleaned and fastened back into
position in the casing using adhesive. Previous examples had been re-assembled using metal rivets, which
substantially increased the metallic signature of the mines; this means that they cannot be used as
detection targets.
9.
The solvent bond around the detonator was removed mechanically, the bond broken from around
the thread of the detonator and the detonator unscrewed from the base of the fuze.
10. The bond around the shoulder of the external fuze housing was then broken, allowing the removal of
the pressure plate and access to the fuze mechanism and striker spring. Some of the internal fuze housings
could be opened by breaking the plastic bonds while others had to be cut.
11.

All components were examined and photos were taken at every stage of disassembly.

12. A sample of five live fuzes, which had not been disassembled, were placed on a sandbag and
subjected to pressure (well in excess of that normally required for initiation) using the bucket of an
armoured excavator in order to assess the condition of the detonator.
13.

The main observations from exploitation are illustrated and described below.
A-2
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Exterior characteristics

Figure A5
The top surface (left) and underside (right) of the mine body with fuze removed. All of the mines recovered
appeared to be in good condition superficially; however, every mine had cracks in the casing

Figure A6
Fine cracks in the casing allow the ingress of water; freezing then gradually extends the breaks

Figure A7
The top surface (left)
and underside (right)
of the fuze assembly.
Most of the fuze
bodies appeared to
be undamaged and
well sealed, yet
almost all were wet
inside

A-3
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Fuze mechanism
Figure A8
Components of the C3B fuze
mechanism. Pressure
applied to the top of the fuze
forces the striker through a
flexible ‘forcing collar’, which
accelerates the striker into
the detonator. The spring
makes relatively little
contribution to this effect

Figure A9
The sealed fuze assembly is very similar to that used in the P4B antipersonnel mine. Water was found inside almost all of these units

Figure A10
Due to corrosion, this striker
Spring weighed only 0.09 g

Explosive components

Figure A11
Upper section of the casing removed to reveal the
main charge; most were in good condition with little
or no cracking or deterioration evident in the
explosive. Although the inside of the plastic casing
was wet, the cast filling contains very few voids
A-4

Figure A12
Booster pellets are composed of a pressed
TNT/RDX (60/40) mixture and virtually all were in
good condition. Despite the neoprene seal
between the base of the fuze and the booster,
all of the booster pockets contained water

Falkland Islands Demining Programme - Exploitation

Figure A13
The composition of the main charge is quoted as
being TNT/RDX/aluminium (50/30/20) but, as
shown here, the mixture is rarely homogenous.
The aluminium content does not affect the
detectability of the mine

Figure A14
The proportions of the constituents in the high
explosive varied significantly; this sample contained
no aluminium whatsoever. This is evidence that
different material characteristics and specifications
may be found within the same lot number

Figure A15
All of the C3B detonator assemblies examined
were wet. The protective layer of clear plastic
film over the stab receptor (right) did not
provide an effective water-tight seal

Figure A16
Subjecting live fuzes to an operating load (>300 kg)
using an excavator bucket did not produce any
detonations. The most likely explanation is that the
stab-receptive composition is no longer functional

Conclusions
14. All of the C3B mines recovered from SA064 appeared to be in good condition superficially, but all of
the casings were cracked. The ingress and subsequent freezing of water is gradually causing the
deterioration of the casings, but the effect is slow due to the small volumes of water and the flexibility of
the plastic. The process is likely to accelerate as existing cracks enlarge and the plastic becomes more
brittle.
15. The rate of deterioration has been slowed substantially by burial. Polystyrene is vulnerable to UV
light and (according to observations made in the late 1980s) the casings of mines exposed to the sun had
cracked badly within a year or two of exposure. Burial is also likely to reduce temperature gradients within
the mines, minimising the expansion of explosive during hot weather and of water during freezing
conditions.
A-5
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16. There is little evidence of deterioration to the plastic of the fuze housing; it is therefore reasonable to
expect that the operating pressure of most buried mines will still exceed 200 kg. However, mines that have
been exposed to sunlight may be capable of functioning under far lower loads.
17. All fuze mechanisms appeared to be operational, despite the corrosion of some striker springs. Fuzes
are likely to remain functional despite the deterioration of the striker spring.
18. The striker spring is the only metal component within the mine. The spring weighs less than 0.15 g
when new and is positioned around 20 mm below the surface of the pressure plate; this makes its
detectability marginal at best. If the striker spring is corroded, the metal content of the mine may be
reduced or eliminated altogether, making it impossible to locate with a metal detector.
19. The explosive constituents of the main charge may vary, but this has little significance to the
functionality of the mine. The booster and main charge remain intact while enclosed by the mine casing
and solubility in ground water is low; the charges are therefore likely to remain viable for many years in
buried mines.
20. Where C3B mines have been exposed to sunlight or have sustained mechanical damage to the
casing, it is likely that the main charge and booster will gradually begin to crack and will eventually
disintegrate.
21. Findings from the Ageing Study suggest that the primary explosive in the detonator is likely to remain
viable for many years, being well protected by its plastic casing. However, the stab-receptive composition
used to initiate the primary explosive is vulnerable to water and prolonged immersion appears to have
rendered many of the detonator assemblies incapable of functioning as designed.
22. The ingress of water into the detonator is dependent on a number of factors and it is entirely
possible that some remain capable of operating as designed. Those that cannot, but which still contain
viable primary explosive, may be detonated by other influences, such as fire or impact.
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ANNEX B
EXPLOITATION OF THE ISOLATED SB-33 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE
Background
1.

The SB-33 is a small anti-personnel mine with the following specifications (approximate):
Weight
Explosive weight
Explosive type

140 g
35 g
RDX/HMX (98/2)

Diameter
Height
Operating pressure

85 mm
30 mm
8 kg

2.
The mine is extremely robust, with most of the components made from polycarbonate plastic; the
fuzing mechanism is designed to be highly resistant to impact and shock. Some of the SB-33 mines
recovered from SA064 are shown in Figure B1.

Figure B1
SB-33 mines recovered from mine
rows in SA064

3.
The isolated mine found in SA064 (Figure B2) showed obvious damage, particularly to the base
(Figure B3) where the detonator plug was cracked and a section of the mine casing had been broken away.
The broken section of the base was found close to the mine body.
4.
The primary purpose of exploitation was to gather evidence to support an explanation for this mine’s
presence outside the minefield rows, in addition to making it safe for disposal.

Figure B2
The SB-33 mine found in SA064

Figure B3
Base view of the casing
B-1
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Findings

Figure B4
On initial inspection, the fuze and main charge
appeared to be relatively intact. The ingress of
water would not prevent the mine from functioning

Figure B5
Removal of the fuze plunger revealed that the
several of the fuze components had been shattered
and the striker displaced

Figure B6
Removal of the fuze components exposed the full
extent of the damage

Figure B7
The detonator plug had also been shattered and
could not be used to remove the detonator

Figure B8
The detonator was seized into place and surrounded
by impacted explosive from the main charge

Figure B9
The main charge, normally a rigid horseshoe of
pressed explosive, had been pulverised
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Conclusions
5.
The isolated SB-33 mine discovered in SA064 had clearly been subjected to a substantial amount of
shock. This was evident in the shattering of fuze components made from polycarbonate (the plastic used in
protective visors) and the pulverisation of the main charge.
6.
Although the exterior of the mine casing showed no evidence of scarring from fragmentation, the
internal damage is entirely consistent with the effects of a nearby detonation.
7.
The damage to the mine, together with its displacement and the presence of a crater in the mine
row, strongly suggest that this mine was thrown out by the detonation of an artillery shell during the
conflict.
8.
The mine was incapable of functioning as designed; however, the condition of the detonator means
that it might have been in an unstable state.
9.
The demining team and DPO were absolutely correct not to attempt to defuze or disassemble this
mine.
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ANNEX C
COMMENTS ON BOOBY TRAP REMNANTS
Background
1.
Several booby traps (BT) were discovered during Phase 3, all being typical of the type laid by
Argentinian forces during the conflict. Each consists of a simple firing device in which a spring-loaded
striker is released by tension on a tripwire. The firing device is designed to initiate a percussion cap, which
ignites a length of pyrotechnic fuze running to a detonator placed within the main charge. The main charge
consists of TNT blocks.
2.

The following booby traps have been located:
SA number

Number of BT found

064

2

Number of TNT blocks
In each
31

095

2

6

095A

2

5

3.
None of the firing devices associated with these booby traps have yet been located, but they are
believed to be the type shown in Figure C1.
4.
Detailed exploitation of the booby trap remnants was not deemed to be worthwhile; however, some
of the comments in the captions below are based on findings from the Landmine Ageing Study1.

Figure C1
The firing device typically used with Argentinian booby traps. The
tube contains a spring-loaded striker retained by both a pin and a
shear wire; this allows for optional pull or pressure actuation. The
striker initiates a percussion cap, which ignites a safety fuse link to
the detonator in the main charge. The safety fuze is retained in the
fuze holder by the screw on the side

1

Figure C2
The fuze holder with percussion cap
removed. The cap unit is a standard
12 bore shotgun primer. Although
robust, these are unlikely to remain
functional after 30 years exposure to
wet conditions

Three year Landmine Ageing Study conducted by C King Associates Ltd in association with James Madison University
under funding from US State Department, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA)
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Findings

Figure C3
Components of the Argentinian firing device

Figure C4
TNT charges from a booby trap in SA064. These
appear to have been 400 g blocks of pressed TNT,
wrapped in waxed paper. Pressed TNT is deemed
‘cap sensitive’, meaning that it can be initiated
directly by a No 8 strength detonator. The edges of
the blocks have been eroded but the bulk of the
explosive remains intact. Historical data on TNT
suggests that it can remain capable of detonation
for several decades

Figure C5
TNT blocks containing detonators and the remnants
of safety fuzes. It is clear that any pyrotechnic
composition in the fuse or detonator will be nonfunctional. However, findings from the Ageing Study
(involving explosives of a similar type and age)
suggested that the primary explosive in the
detonator may be viable; this means that the
explosive could be initiated by either fire or
substantial impact
C-2
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Conclusions
5.
The booby traps found during Phase 3 were incapable of functioning as designed for the following
reasons:
a.

Firing devices were absent;

b.
Even if firing devices had been present, data from the Ageing Study suggests that internal
components (such as the steel striker spring) would be seized and incapable of functioning;
c.
The shotgun primer used as the percussion cap is unlikely to remain functional after
prolonged exposure to wet conditions;
d.
The pyrotechnic compositions of the safety fuse and detonator flash receptor are
vulnerable to water and were virtually unprotected for more than 30 years.
6.
The Ageing Study suggests that the primary explosive within the detonator may still be capable of
detonation. Initiation might arise from heat (such as a peat fire) or from shock (such as the impact from a
flail hammer).
7.
If the detonator functions, it is quite likely that TNT in contact will be initiated; this may, in turn,
detonate other adjacent TNT blocks.
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